A decision support system for urban infrastructure inter-asset management employing domain ontologies and qualitative uncertainty-based reasoning by Wei, Lijun et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Decision Support System for Urban 
Infrastructure Inter-Asset Management 
Employing Domain Ontologies and Qualitative 
Uncertainty-based Reasoning 
 
Wei, L., Du, H., Mahesar, Q.-A, Al Ammari, K., Magee, D.R., Clarke, B., 
Dimitrova, V., Gunn, D., Entwisle, D., Reeves, H., Cohn, A.G. 
  
Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Nottingham Ningbo 
China, 199 Taikang East Road, Ningbo, 315100, Zhejiang, China. 
 
First published 2020 
 
This work is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0   
 
The work is licenced to the University of Nottingham Ningbo China 
under the Global University Publication Licence: 
https://www.nottingham.edu.cn/en/library/documents/research-
support/global-university-publications-licence-2.0.pdf  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Decision Support System for Urban Infrastructure Inter-Asset Management Employing
Domain Ontologies and Qualitative Uncertainty-based Reasoning
Lijun Weia, ,˚ Heshan Dua,b, Quratul-ain Mahesara,1, Kareem Al Ammaria, Derek R. Mageea, Barry Clarkec, Vania Dimitrovaa,
David Gunnd,2, David Entwisled,2, Helen Reevesd,2, Anthony G. Cohna,e,˚
aSchool of Computing, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom
bSchool of Computer Science, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo, China
cSchool of Civil Engineering, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom
dBritish Geological Survey, Keyworth, Nottingham, United Kingdom
eCollege of Electronic and Information Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai, China
Abstract
Urban infrastructure assets (e.g. roads, water pipes) perform critical functions to the health and well-being of society. Although
it has been widely recognised that different infrastructure assets are highly interconnected, infrastructure management in practice
such as planning, installation and maintenance are often undertaken by different stakeholders without considering these dependen-
cies due to the lack of relevant data and cross-domain knowledge, which may cause unexpected cascading social, economic and
environmental effects. In this paper, we present a knowledge based decision support system for urban infrastructure inter-asset
management. By considering various infrastructure assets (e.g. road, ground, cable), triggers (e.g. pipe leaking) and potential con-
sequences (e.g. traffic disruption) as a holistic system, we model each sub-domain using a modular ontology and encapsulate the
interdependence between them using a set of rules. Moreover, qualitative likelihood is assigned to each rule by domain experts (e.g.
civil engineers) to encode the uncertainty of knowledge, and an inference engine is applied to predict the potential consequences of
a given trigger with location specific data and the encoded rules. A web-based prototype system has been developed based on the
above concept and demonstrated to a wide range of stakeholders. The system can assist in the process of decision making by aiding
data collation and integration, as well as presenting potential consequences of possible triggers, advising on whether additional
information is needed or suggesting ways of obtaining such information. The work shows an intelligent approach to integrate and
process multi-source data to pioneer a novel way to aid a complex decision process with a high social impact.
Keywords: smart cities, infrastructure maintenance, underground utilities, rule-based system, reasoning under uncertainty
1. Introduction
Urban infrastructure assets, such as roads, ground and util-
ities (e.g. water, electricity, gas), are critical to the function-
ing of modern society (Clarke et al., 2017). Without efficient
and effective diagnosis and maintenance, asset failures such as
ground sinking caused by underground sewer collapse, can lead
to significant economic, social, and environmental costs (Hoj-
jati et al., 2016). These problems are particularly challenging
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in urban areas with increasing destructive street works due to
extreme weather and ageing infrastructure. Research efforts
have been devoted to developing various kinds of decision sup-
port systems (DSSs) for proactive urban infrastructure main-
tenance (Halfawy, 2010; Hojjati et al., 2016; Quintero et al.,
2005; Rogers et al., 2012). For example, Arsene et al. (2012)
proposed a decision support system for water pipe leakage de-
tection, Moazami et al. (2011) proposed a supporting tool for
pavement rehabilitation and maintenance prioritisation using
fuzzy logic. But in general, these systems are confronted with
four practical challenges for achieving proactive maintenance.
The first challenge is that urban infrastructure assets are in-
terdependent at multiple levels (Ouyang, 2014; Rogers et al.,
2012), but they are usually constructed and maintained by dif-
ferent stakeholders who plan and conduct street works inde-
pendently without considering these interdependencies. Con-
struction works or deterioration related to one asset may dam-
age other assets nearby, causing cascading problems (Ouyang,
2014). For example, breaking up or opening a road may damage
the underlying ground and buried utilities. Although it has been
widely recognised that an integrated (Halfawy, 2010; Quintero
et al., 2005) or a “system of systems” approach (Hall et al.,
Preprint submitted to Expert Systems with Applications June 3, 2020
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2016) is needed for infrastructure management, the lack of ex-
plicit knowledge of asset interdependencies makes it difficult
for decision makers to have a holistic view of the potential im-
pact of their actions. Moreover, the ground, which supports the
road and the buried utilities and transmits actions (e.g. traffic
load) between them, is rarely considered by practitioners as an
asset (Clarke et al., 2017; Rogers et al., 2012). Successful im-
plementation of an integrated approach largely depends on the
ability to share comprehensive multi-sector knowledge, espe-
cially the broad knowledge of asset interdependencies.
The second challenge is that decision making in urban infras-
tructure management requires a variety of data (Quintero et al.,
2005), such as underground utility maps, road construction de-
tails and road closure regulations. This data is often held by
different data owners and stored in disconnected or even incom-
patible platforms, which makes it difficult for decision makers
to gather useful data in a short period of time. The ability to
integrate disconnected datasets into one single system would
be helpful for decision makers (Michele and Daniela, 2011).
Although semantic techniques have been proposed to integrate
various buried asset data based on ontologies (Balasubramani
et al., 2017; Halfawy, 2010; Quintero and Pierre, 2002), none
of these work considered other contextual information in the
urban infrastructure system, such as weather, road traffic, and
ground conditions, which significantly limits their applicability
in complex decision scenarios.
The third challenge is how to devise appropriate methods for
proactive infrastructure maintenance, i.e. to predict the poten-
tial consequences of actions/observations in infrastructure man-
agement and suggest appropriate countermeasures. This re-
quires identifying potential consequences / hazards on infras-
tructure assets (e.g. road collapse), society (e.g. traffic de-
lays/disruptions, damage to property) and environment (e.g.
ground contamination), as well as identifying the causes (e.g.
possible behaviours) that may lead to these consequences and
the internal mechanism. For example, model-based techniques,
such as probabilistic models and neural networks were used for
water pipe failure prediction (Arsene et al., 2012; Hadzilacos
et al., 2000) and electrical utility maintenance (Bumblauskas
et al., 2017); case-based reasoning techniques were used for se-
lecting infrastructure intervention techniques (Quintero et al.,
2005). However, all these techniques require a set of historical
data or cases as training samples, which do not always exist in
practice. Instead of learning from voluminous historical data,
Marlow et al. (2015) used logical rules formulated by domain
experts to suggest suitable pipe and road pavements rehabilita-
tion techniques. The advantage of using rule-based approach
lie in the fact that rules are based on experts’ knowledge un-
derpinned by observation, experiments and theory so they have
limited dependence on historical data; the experience from one
city’s infrastructure can also be easily generalised to another
city. But this approach has not been fully examined for diag-
nosis and predicting consequences in urban infrastructure man-
agement yet.
The last challenge is that in the application of rule-based
approach, rules formulated by domain experts are not always
certain but require hedging with a confidence. To solve this,
Figure 1: Building blocks of the ATU-DSS: given a trigger, an inference engine
is able to predict the potential consequences by reasoning with uncertain data
and rules developed based on a set of modular ontologies.
approaches such as Certainty Factors (CFs) (Shortliffe and
Buchanan, 1975) have been proposed by attaching degrees of
belief to propositions and rules. However, research warned
that certainty factors could yield disastrously incorrect degrees
of belief through over-counting of evidence in several circum-
stances (Heckerman, 1986), especially when the rule sets be-
come larger. So almost all CFs based rule systems were ei-
ther purely diagnostic (e.g. MYCIN) or predictive (Heckerman,
1986; Heckerman and Shortliffe, 1992). Additionally, the be-
lief in rules is usually specified by domain experts using nu-
merical values, whereas human judgemental reasoning is often
more qualitative than numerical (Parsons and Parsons, 2001).
Fuzzy rules have also been used to encode the uncertainty of
knowledge (Chen, 1994; Malmir et al., 2017; Moazami et al.,
2011), but this method still requires numerical range values for
deciding the membership functions and may be challenging for
non-academic domain experts without logic background. The
domain engineers we consulted in civil engineering also sug-
gested that it is difficult to formulate rules with numeric values,
especially in the case of dealing with the ground. In fact, in
many cases, precise specification of numerical values may not
be necessary for supporting decision making (Goldszmidt and
Pearl, 1996; Wellman, 1990).
1.1. Our Contribution
In order to meet the challenges described above, we present
an intelligent web-based decision support system for urban
infrastructure inter-asset management based on a system-of-
systems approach (Figure 1), especially focusing on the assets
in direct contact with the underground world, including road,
ground and underground utilities. The system is called Assess-
ing the Underworld DSS, referred to as ATU-DSS hereafter3.
The above four challenges were addressed as below: 1) firstly,
3UK EPSRC funded Assessing the Underworld (ATU) Project
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to help address the challenge of multi-sector knowledge shar-
ing, urban infrastructure is considered as a system of multiple
subsystems and a family of interlinked modular ontologies were
developed to capture the domain knowledge on each sector, in-
cluding assets (e.g. pipe), related triggers (e.g. road cracks),
potential consequences (e.g. loss of utility service) and investi-
gation techniques (e.g. ground penetrating radar surveys), etc.
Then, based on the concepts defined in these domain ontolo-
gies, a set of logical rules were developed to encapsulate the
interdependencies between different assets (e.g. “IF RoadBase-
WaterContent increases and PipeLeakingRate is Severe, THEN
RoadBaseStiffness will definitely decrease”) and the relations
leading to serious asset failures or other hazard consequences.
2) secondly, to help address the challenge of disconnected data,
various spatial datasets about the infrastructure assets and their
contextual information were sourced from different owners and
integrated in a single system to provide instant location spe-
cific data retrieval. 3) thirdly, to face the challenge of proactive
maintenance and limited historic data, our system adopted a
rule based reasoning approach, which could be enriched when
more human decisions or real data are fed in. An inference en-
gine is applied to infer the potential consequences of a reported
trigger based on the knowledge in the rule base and the retrieved
data from the integrated database. 4) lastly, a qualitative uncer-
tainty based reasoning approach is proposed to handle the chal-
lenge of uncertainty in human knowledge; the system can also
make assumption of the states of missing data to derive poten-
tial issues when not all data is available and suggest investiga-
tion methods to obtain the missing data. This function allows
practitioners to plan for further surveys to reduce the potential
risk.
Our contribution in this work is twofold. Theoretically, we
proposed a framework (shown in Figure 1) for developing a
knowledge-driven decision support system using a system-of-
systems approach, which can be easily generalised to various
engineering applications. The framework starts by identifica-
tion and modelling of subsystems using modular ontologies,
and capturing their interdependencies using logical rules, fol-
lowed by definition of triggers which may affect the subsystems
and definition of consequences which may have serious impact
on the subsystems or external environment (e.g. social conse-
quences). Then, an inference engine is applied to predict the
potential consequences of given triggers and advise on whether
additional information is needed and suggest ways of obtaining
such information. Practically, a prototype system has been de-
veloped based on the above concept by combining real-time site
specific data retrieval with automated reasoning. It also allows
users to modify data values for alternative analysis.
The prototype system can help decision makers (e.g. incident
managers, contractors, local authorities) to gather relevant data
in one-stop, store and re-use previously collected data, cod-
ify requirements from local authorities (e.g. restrictions), pre-
dict possible issues of observations or actions in advance, and
learned wisdom (e.g. issues encountered) from previous expe-
rience to help data interpretation and decision making. These
functions can improve safety in infrastructure management and
reduce costs and prevent delays. For example, this system can
help institutions pass on knowledge to junior engineers and help
answering questions like (Clarke et al., 2017): aq How will the
condition of road surface, adjacent pipes and ground at a spe-
cific site change because of extreme weather, deterioration of
assets, or human actions (e.g. planned excavation)? b) Will this
change cause any undesirable consequences (e.g. traffic dis-
ruption, loss of services or even fatalities)? and c) which asset
should we maintain/replace in the first place or when and where
should we install a new underground asset? This evaluation of
the undesirable consequences is different from traditional traffic
or environmental impact assessment as it takes into account the
knowledge of different factors and their inter-dependencies to
achieve a more comprehensive assessment. The system can also
suggest the likelihood and severity of potential consequences
which can help decision makers to prioritise their maintenance
tasks, preparation of health/safety files and reduce the potential
risk of high likelihood and severity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 briefly
introduces the ATU domain ontologies; section 3 explains the
qualitative uncertainty based reasoning approach and the strat-
egy for handling missing data in this system. We then provide
a detailed description of the prototype system in section 4, in-
cluding how the rule base was developed, what exemplar data
sources were integrated and different functions of the user in-
terface; followed by discussions in section 5 and conclusions in
section 6.
2. ATU Ontologies: A Common Vocabulary for Data Inte-
gration and Reasoning
An ontology is a formal representation of the knowledge
within a domain using a set of concepts and relationships be-
tween them (Staab and Studer, 2009). It can be used as a com-
mon vocabulary and thus plays an important role in information
sharing (Gruber, 1993; Noy and McGuinness, 2001). More for-
mally, an ontology consists of a TBox which defines terminolo-
gies or knowledge at the conceptual level, and an ABox which
describes facts about individuals using terminologies defined in
the TBox (Baader et al., 2007; Du et al., 2013). A TBox con-
tains definitions of classes or concepts and definitions of roles
or object properties, which cover the conceptual hierarchies and
relations among classes. An ABox contains assertions about in-
dividuals or instances.
There exist several ontologies where concepts of infrastruc-
ture assets (such as the ground/soil, roads and buried pipes/-
cables) are defined. The concept Soil or Ground is defined in
general environmental ontologies or thesauri, including the Se-
mantic Web for Earth and Environment Technology (SWEET)
ontology (Raskin and Pan, 2005), the environment ontology
(ENVO) (Buttigieg et al., 2013), the General Multilingual En-
vironmental Thesaurus (GEMET)4, the AGROVOC Multilin-
gual Thesaurus5, etc., as well as ontologies specialised for
describing soil (Das, 2010; dos Santos Aparı´cio et al., 2006;
4http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet. Accessed: 2020-02-26.
5http://aims.fao.org/standards/agrovoc. Accessed: 2020-02-26.
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Figure 2: Inter-dependencies between different domain ontologies.
Heeptaisong and Srivihok, 2010; Shivananda and Kumar, 2013;
Zhao et al., 2009). Buried assets, such as pipes and cables,
are defined in several infrastructure management ontologies or
utility ontologies (Fu and Cohn, 2008; Osman and El-Diraby,
2006; Zeb and Froese, 2014). The concept Road is defined
in several transportation ontologies as part of the transporta-
tion network (Corsar et al., 2015; Katsumi and Fox, 2019;
Lorenz et al., 2005), and defined in ontologies for urban devel-
opment (Berdier, 2011; Berdier and Roussey, 2007). A survey
of existing transportation ontologies has been provided recently
by Katsumi and Fox (2018). The concept Road is also defined
in general ontologies or vocabularies covering various domains,
such as the environment ontology (ENVO) (Buttigieg et al.,
2013), the DBpedia Ontology6, the Linked Open Vocabularies
(LOV)7, etc. However, none of the ontologies above provides
a systematic and comprehensive description of soil/pipe/road
properties and processes, nor how soil/pipe/road properties and
processes affect each other.
At the heart of the ATU-DSS is a suite of interlinked mod-
ular ontologies (Figure 2), developed by following the NeOn
methodology (Sua´rez-Figueroa et al., 2012), consulting vari-
ous domain experts (e.g. geotechnical engineers, geophysicists)
and extensively reviewing literature, existing ontologies (e.g.
NASA’s SWEET ontology (Raskin and Pan, 2005)), standards
and datasets. The ATU ontologies are written in OWL 2 Web
Ontology Language Manchester Syntax (Horridge and Patel-
Schneider, 2012), which is based on description logic. Whilst
we are aware of the recent work on fuzzy ontologies (Morente-
Molinera et al., 2019), which allows fuzzy relations addition-
ally compared to regular ontologies, the ontologies we defined
here are regular or crisp ontologies. To ensure the high quality
of knowledge defined in them, the ATU ontologies are created
semi-automatically, going through an iterative process involv-
ing several discussions and meetings with domain experts. As
shown in Figure 2, the ATU ontologies model the knowledge
6https://wiki.dbpedia.org/services-resources/ontology.
Accessed: 2020-02-26.
7https://lov.linkeddata.es/dataset/lov/. Accessed: 2020-02-
26.
on infrastructure assets, triggers, environment and investigation
techniques (e.g. sensors) for urban infrastructure management.
Each ontology is introduced in the following sections.
The ATU Urban Infrastructure Asset Ontologies describe
the main concepts and relations of underground related ur-
ban infrastructure assets using three ontologies, including the
soil/ground, road (surface infrastructure) and pipe (buried util-
ities) (Du et al., 2017, 2016). Each asset ontology models
the investigated asset using a set of properties (e.g. ground
clay content), processes (e.g. ground biological process) and
simple relations about how properties and processes affect
each other (Du et al., 2016). The processes and properties
are grouped into categories as the characteristics of the asset,
such as GroundBiologicalProcess and GroundChemicalProp-
erty. The number of processes and properties in the three asset
ontologies are shown in Table 1. An example of the hierarchy
of the ATU Pipe Ontology is shown in Figure 3.
Table 1: Number of processes and properties in ATU urban infrastructure asset
ontologies.
Ontology Number of Processes Number of Properties
Ground Ontology 36 61
Road Ontology 17 85
Pipe Ontology 4 50
A key feature of these ontologies is that within an asset
ontology, a change in a property would activate a process
which leads to a change in other property(s). This cascad-
ing structure was achieved by encoding the dependency be-
tween classes in each sub-ontology with six relationships, in-
cluding hasImpactOn and its inverse influencedBy, as well as
increases, decreases and their inverse increasedBy and de-
creasedBy (Du et al., 2017, 2016). An example of the cas-
cading relationships between different ontology concepts is
“GroundSwelling decreases the GroundStiffness which hasIm-
pactOn some GroundS-WaveVelocity“. The complex relation-
ships between multiple concepts are defined with rules and
will be explained in Section 3. The urban infrastructure as-
set ontologies are publicly available at https://doi.org/10.
4
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Figure 3: An example of the ontology concept hierarchy of pipe properties.
5518/1908.
The ATU Trigger Ontology defines the categories and prop-
erties of events that may cause cascading effect on infrastruc-
ture assets (Clarke et al., 2017). They are often human actions
such as planned construction works, or observable phenomena
like natural phenomena (e.g. excessive rainfall, extreme tem-
peratures), abnormal observations on road (e.g road cracks), on
ground (e.g. ground movement) or on buried utilities (e.g. drop
in water pressure). For example, rainfall is an external trig-
ger which infiltrates the ground and leading to an increase in
GroundWaterContent. 32 types of triggers were included in the
trigger ontology as shown in Figure 4, each of which relates to a
scenario that we want to tackle in urban infrastructure manage-
ment. The properties of triggers include general properties like
severity, location/spatial geometry (e.g. point, linestring) and
time (a time point or a period), and specific properties like the
type of a construction work. In the prototype DSS system, a de-
cision process starts with a report of a trigger by users through
the user interface.
The ATU Consequence Ontology identifies various conse-
quences in infrastructure management, such as direct conse-
quences on stakeholders (e.g. cost overrun) or on infrastructure
assets (e.g. pipe burst, trench collapse), and indirect legal, so-
cial, economical (e.g. traffic disruption) or environmental con-
sequences (e.g. water pollution) on the general public. Each
consequence is attached with a context-dependent severity level
(e.g. Negligible, Marginal, Critical, Catastrophic).
ATU Investigation Ontology (Sensors). Being different from
the well known Semantic Sensor Network (SSN) ontology9, the
ATU Investigation Ontology (Sensors) encodes the knowledge
of currently available techniques for obtaining different infras-
tructure asset properties. These techniques can include a pointer
to an external institution (e.g. website), a laboratory test, or dif-
8Accessed: 2020-02-23
9SSN ontology: https://www.w3.org/TR/vocab-ssn/. Accessed:
2020-02-23.
(a) Trigger types. (b) Trigger properties.
Figure 4: Triggers and their properties included in the Trigger Ontology.
ferent types of sensor surveys. By working with domain experts
in geotechnical engineering and geophysics and reviewing lit-
erature (sen, 1988), the current ontology includes seven classes
(e.g. seismic methods, electrical methods) and 26 types of geo-
physical techniques (e.g. Ground Penetrating Radar), together
with their relationships with the ATU Urban Infrastructure As-
set Ontologies. Two relationships were defined to describe the
suitability of an investigation method for measuring different
5
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asset properties in shallow (0-5m depth) surveys. The relation-
ships are measures and its inverse measuredBy, which means
“SensorA Measures PropertyB with usefulness score N”, and
“PropertyB is MeasuredBy SensorA with usefulness score N”.
The investigation suggestions and the corresponding usefulness
score N (i.e. an integer between 0 and 4, where 0 means “not
considered applicable” and 4 means “generally considered an
excellent and well developed approach”) of each relation were
assigned by domain experts and implemented in OWL Prote´ge´
as annotations (which can be queried). With these relationships
established, appropriate investigation techniques can be recom-
mended to users in a prototype decision support system when
the data of an asset property is missing. Other investigation
methods can also be added into the knowledge base in the fu-
ture.
The ATU Environment Ontology models the environment
factors (e.g. rainfall, drought) affecting or being affected by
the infrastructure assets. Instead of building this ontology from
scratch like the modular ontologies presented above, the Envi-
ronment Ontology was created based on several existing exter-
nal ontologies (e.g. NASA’s SWEET Ontology10, the Environ-
ment Ontology11, Ordnance Survey’s Buildings and Places On-
tology12). This is because our work does not need a thorough
modelling of the environment, but only need several essential
concepts like rainfall, drought, contamination.
The concepts in these ATU ontologies are used to guide rel-
evant data sourcing, and as a common vocabulary for defining
inference rules (complex relationships between multiple ontol-
ogy concepts) and integrating various datasets from different
domains such that heterogeneous data can be used seamlessly
in automated reasoning. Though ontologies have been used
widely for knowledge modelling and information retrieval (Mu-
nir and Anjum, 2018), most of the existing approaches use a
single domain ontology rather than a series of ontologies cov-
ering various domains as we do here. For more details of the
ATU ontologies, interested readers are referred to one of our
earlier works (Du et al., 2016) on soil ontology. The authors
are also preparing a separate paper to introduce the modelling
process of ATU ontologies.
3. Qualitative Uncertainty based Reasoning in Rule-based
Systems
Based on the concepts defined in the ATU ontologies, we
continue to develop logical rules in collaboration with domain
experts to encapsulate the broad knowledge of internal depen-
dencies in one subsystem, as well as the external dependencies
between different infrastructure assets, environment factors and
human activities. For example, a rule “Heavy and Long rainfall
will infiltrate the road if the road crack penetrates the road sur-
face.” is defined referring to the concepts in the Environment
10https://bioportal.bioontology.org/ontologies/SWEET. Ac-
cessed: 2020-02-23.
11http://environmentontology.org/. Accessed: 2020-02-23.
12http://bit.ly/2Fq5u0F. Accessed: 2020-02-23.
Ontology and the Road Ontology, written as: “EnvironmentRain-
fallIntensity (Heavy)^ EnvironmentRainfallDuration (Long)^ Road-
CrackingDepth (High)
De f initeùùùñ RoadWaterInfiltration (Active) ”.
As discussed previously, rules are often conditional and re-
quire augmenting with confidence, but the domain engineers we
consulted in urban infrastructure management found it difficult
to formulate rules with numeric probabilities. Instead they pre-
ferred expressing uncertain information using qualitative lin-
guistic expressions, which is in accordance with the theory pro-
posed by Wallsten and Budescu (1995) on human reasoning. In
this work, we present a qualitative confidence levels based un-
certainty management scheme, which is considered to be more
accessible by our domain experts compared with the linguistic
quantifiers used with fuzzy sets theory (Bonissone et al., 1987;
Cid-Lo´pez et al., 2017; Zadeh, 1984) or kappa calculus (Clin-
ton and David, 2004; Goldman and Maraist, 2015; Goldszmidt
and Pearl, 1996; Poole and Smyth, 2005). The proposed con-
fidence levels can also be interpreted in terms of the degrees
of surprise using kappa calculus or using probability. Differ-
ent calculation formulae are proposed to sequentially propagate
the qualitative confidences of data and rules, as well as com-
bine parallel chains leading to the same conclusion. It is an ex-
tension of our previous work (Mahesar et al., 2017) by adding
probabilistic interpretations of the approach, adding a mecha-
nism to avoid multi-counting of the same fact in different rules,
checking potential contradictions in the rule base and consider-
ing diagnostic rules for abductive inference.
3.1. Definition of Qualitative Confidence Levels and Confi-
dence Vectors
3.1.1. Qualitative Confidence Levels
In the scope of this paper, six qualitative confidence levels
{Impossible, Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, Very Likely, Defi-
nite} were empirically selected to describe experts’ confidence
in a rule, i.e. the degree of people’s (e.g. domain experts) belief
of the conclusion is true given the premise. The confidence lev-
els can be any other ordered linguistic lists (i.e. words/phrases)
if the list follows an order from impossible to definite. For ex-
ample, a list {impossible, very improbable, improbable, proba-
ble, very probable, definite} could be used to replace the one
used in this work. Furthermore, the confidence levels gran-
ularity depends on the requirements of different applications.
For example, the designer of a decision support system could
simplify the confidence levels of rule sets from six to four as
{Impossible, Unlikely, Likely, Definite} if they want to ease the
workload of domain experts. .
Definitions of the six confidence levels used in our work are
listed in table 2. These confidence levels constitute three pairs
of symmetrical confidence levels, including {Impossible vs Def-
inite}, {Very Unlikely vs Very Likely}, and {Unlikely vs Likely}.
With this feature, domain experts are free to use any of the two
states of a binary variable (e.g. On/Off, Active/Inactive) for au-
thoring rules, since the complementary confidence level can be
automatically inferred to guarantee other related rules could be
fired. For example, let’s assume a binary variable B with two
6
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Table 2: Definitions of confidence levels for an event E happening.
Confidence level Definition
Definite (D) 100% sure that E will happen
Very likely (V) not 100% but only rarely will E not happen
Likely (L) E happens more than 50% of the time but it is notsurprising if E does not happen
Unlikely (U) E happens less than 50% of the time but it is notsurprising if E happens
Very unlikely (VU) not 0% chance of E happening but it will happenrarely
Impossible (I) E never happens
states On and Off, and two rules:
R1 :“If A, Then it is Definite that B is On2
R2 :“If B is Off, Then it is Likely that C will increase2
(1)
Originally, if we observe A, the first rule will be fired but
the second not. However, based on our definition above, we
can generate a new rule based on the first rule as: “If A,
Then it is Impossible that B is Off ”. With this rule added and
fired, the second rule will also be fired to further infer the state
of C. Such complementary rules are added to the system auto-
matically in the rule definition phase. We can also attach quali-
tative confidences to input facts to reflect their imprecision due
to the inaccuracies in observation or measurement limitations
(e.g. instrument precision).
Confidence levels can also be interpreted in terms of the de-
grees of surprise using kappa calculus (Goldszmidt and Pearl,
1996), an order of magnitude calculus in which each compo-
nent is an order of magnitude more surprising than the next;
a probability distribution P can be mapped to a kappa ranking
κ such that P{κ is finite but not infinitesimal for an infinitesi-
mal . Kappa rankings can be interpreted as an approximation
to probabilities through the following relations (Darwiche and
Goldszmidt, 1994):
κpα^ βq “ κpα|βq ` κpβq (2)
κpα_ βq “ minpκpαq, κpβqq (3)
where multiplication in probabilities (Ppα^ βq “ Ppα|βqPpβq)
is replaced by addition of kappa values (Eq. 2), and addition of
probabilities (Ppα_βq “ Ppαq`Ppβq´Ppα^βq) is replaced by
minimisation in the kappa calculus (Eq. 3) (Clinton and David,
2004; Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1996; Poole and Smyth, 2005).
3.1.2. Qualitative Confidence Vectors of Facts and Rules
For computation purpose, instead of directly using the lin-
guistic confidence levels or a single confidence value (i.e., a
scalar), we use an ordered vector of four numerical elements
(abbreviation of {Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, Very Likely})
to encode the confidence level of a rule or a fact, called confi-
dence vectors as:
C “ xVU, U, L, Vy (4)
The four elements of the confidence vector CF of a fact can
have any non-negative integer elements, while the confidence
vector CR of a predictive rule can have at most one positive ele-
ment corresponding to the confidence levels defined in Table 2.
For example, a rule “If A happens, then it is likely that B will
happen” is attached with a confidence level Likely and the cor-
responding confidence vector is CR “ x0, 0, 1, 0y. It should be
noted that confidence level D (Definite) is implicit in the defini-
tion when VU, U, L, V are all 0, and confidence level I (Impossi-
ble) is implicit in the definition when any of the vector elements
is with an extreme large number (for example, VU “ 1000 is
assigned to rules marked as Impossible in our application)13.
This vector representation is designed to store the accumulated
uncertainties from data and rules using simple bit-addition. We
can also easily restore the approximate probability from a confi-
dence vector at the end of an inference process. However, if the
uncertainties are represented using one single scalar, addition
cannot be used any more as it will be difficult to separate and
reconstruct the uncertainty from one single accumulated scalar.
More explanations will be given in the next section.
Interpretation of confidence vectors. Given the confidence
vector C “ xVU,U, L,Vy of a fact E (or a rule R), assuming that
each element of this vector can be represented by a numerical
value ai between 0 and 1, the probability p (a measure of an
expert’s belief) of this fact (rule) to happen can be calculated
as:
pE “ aVU1 ¨ aU2 ¨ aL3 ¨ aV4 (5)
where ta1, a2, a3, a4u P r0, 1s, a1 ă a2 ă a3 ă a4 and
tVU,U, L,Vu P Z`, pE P r0, 1s. It can be noted that pE ap-
proximates 0 when any of the vector elements gets extremely
large (e.g. a conclusion is inferred from a long sequence of un-
certain rules), especially for VU since a1 is close to zero; while
pE will be close to 1 when the sum of tVU, U, L, Vu is getting
close to 0. The extreme case is when VU, U, L, V are all 0, pE is
equal to 1, which is consistent with the definition of “Definite”
in Equation 4. The numerical values of ta1, a2, a3, a4u can vary
for different applications or for different experts (though should
be consistent in one knowledge base). The confidence vector
provides an easy and intuitive way to encode and propagate the
uncertainties in a rule-based system.
In terms of kappa-calculus, by taking logs of the probability
defined in Equation 5 (with a positive infinitesimal base ) and
replacing multiplication by addition, we get the surprise level
of E (or R) happening as:
κpEq “ pVU ˚ log a1 ` U ˚ log a2 ` L ˚ log a3 ` V ˚ log a4q
“ xVU,U, L,Vy ˚ xlog a1, log a2, log a3, log a4yT
“ xVU,U, L,Vy ˚ K
(6)
The surprise that E happens comes from the surprise of each
element of xVU,U, L,Vy, and can be re-written as the multi-
plication of the confidence vector xVU,U, L,Vy and a constant
vector K “ xlog a1, log a2, log a3, log a4yT which represents
13More details about Impossible will be given in the following sections. For
example, assume C “ x1000, 0, 0, 0y and the probability related to VU is a1 =
0.01, the corresponding probability of this confidence vector is P “ a10001 “
0.011000 « 0; therefore, we consider this fact/rule as impossible.
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the surprise of different confidence levels. As  is infinitesi-
mal, ta1, a2, a3, a4u P r0, 1s and xVU,U, L,Vy are non-negative
numbers, the kappa values are always non-negative. When all
elements of xVU,U, L,Vy are zero, the surprise of E happening
is zero which is consistent with the definition of Definite in Ta-
ble 2. In the following sections, we explain how to propagate
the confidence vectors of data and rules in different situations.
3.2. Formula 1: the confidence level of a rule’s conclusion
given one fact.
For a rule R1 with one premise,
R1 : I f a, then b;
if our confidence in a is Ca “ xVUa,Ua, La,Vay, and the ex-
perts’ confidence in this rule is CR1 “ xVUR1,UR1, LR1,VR1y,
then our confidence in the conclusion b, denoted as Ca,b (based
on a), can be computed by adding the confidence vectors of the
premise and the rule, written as:
Ca,b “ Ca `CR1
“ xVUa ` VUR1,Ua ` UR1, La ` LR1,Va ` VR1y (7)
For example, if we have Ca “ x0, 0, 0, 0y and CR1 “ x0, 0, 0, 1y
(Very Likely); then, we can estimate the confidence in b as
Ca,b “ xVUa ` VUR1,Ua ` UR1, La ` LR1,Va ` VR1y “
x0, 0, 0, 0y ` x0, 0, 0, 1y “ x0, 0, 0, 1y. How to combine the un-
certainty of a fact inferred from parallel rules will be discussed
in Sec 3.4.
Interpretation of Formula 1. As rule R1 defines the belief
in b when a happens (Ppb|aqq, we can obtain the joint probabil-
ity of b and a through rule R1 as:
Ppa, bq “ PpaqPpb|aq (8)
Note we can not derive Ppbq since Ppb| aq is not defined in this
rule. In terms of kappa-calculus, the surprise of pa ^ bq hap-
pening can be obtained based on the addition formula in Equa-
tion 2, and linked to confidence vectors based on the definition
of kappa values in Equation 6:
κpa^ bq “ κpaq ` κpb|aq “ Ca ˚ K `Cb|a ˚ K
“ xVUa ` VUR1,Ua ` UR1, La ` LR1,Va ` VR1y ˚ K
ñ Ca^b “ xVUa ` VUR1,Ua ` UR1, La ` LR1,Va ` VR1y
(9)
The derived confidence vector is the same as the formula in
Equation 7, thus it can be considered as a simple way to accu-
mulate the kappa values (the first part of κpEq) of different facts
and rules. We can decide the surprise level of a derived fact
by multiplying K with the derived confidence vector and tuning
the values of a1, a2, a3, and a4.
3.3. Formula 2: the confidence level of a rule’s conclusion
given a conjunction of facts.
For a rule R2 with n uncertain premises Ai and confidence
vector CR2 “ xVUR2,UR2, LR2,VR2y:
R2 : I f A1 ^ A2 ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ An, then B;
If our confidence in each fact Ai is CAi “ xVUi, Ui, Li, Viy
and assuming all the facts are independent, our confidence in
the conjunction of pA1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ Anq can be calculated by taking
the sum of the confidence vectors of all these facts, written as:
CpA1^¨¨¨^Anq “
ÿ
i
CAi “ x
ÿ
i
VUi,
ÿ
i
Ui,
ÿ
i
Li,
ÿ
i
Viy (10)
After obtaining the confidence CpA1^¨¨¨^Anq in the conjunction
of premises, our confidence in the conclusion B can be derived
based on Formula 1 (Equation 7) by adding the confidence vec-
tors of the rule and the premises:
CpA1^¨¨¨^Anq,B “ CpA1^¨¨¨^Anq `CR2 (11)
For example, if our confidence in a rule “If c and d, then h” is
CR “ x0, 1, 0, 0y pUnlikelyq and the two facts Cc “ x0, 0, 1, 0y,
Cd “ x0, 0, 0, 1y, we have:
Cpc^dq,h “ px0, 0, 1, 0y ` x0, 0, 0, 1yq ` x0, 1, 0, 0y
“ x0, 0, 1, 1y ` x0, 1, 0, 0y “ x0, 1, 1, 1y
In the above formula, we assume all premises are independent.
In terms of risk we may want to know if there is any chance the
premises are not independent as this may suggest a higher con-
fidence of the inferred fact14. The following solution of multi-
count problem partially handles the dependencies of premises
(when one premise is used to infer other premises).
Avoidance of “Multi-count” Problem of Uncertainties.
In rule based systems, whenever we have a rule of the form
A ñ B, we can conclude B given A without worrying about
other rules; and once B is proved, it can be used regardless of
how it was derived. However, in dealing with probabilities, the
source of the premises of a conclusion is important for sub-
sequent reasoning (Russell and Norvig, 2010). Ignoring this
may result in “multi-count” of the uncertainties of several facts
during inference (Heckerman, 1986; Heckerman and Shortliffe,
1992). For example, assume there are two input facts {a, b} and
two rules in the knowledge base:
Rule 1 : i f a and b, then c;
Rule 2 : i f c and a, then d.
(12)
Based on Formula 2 (Equation 10 and 11), we can derive the
uncertainty of c and d and record all the facts used to deduce
each fact (Mahesar et al., 2017):
Rule 1 : ñ Cc “ xCa `Cb `CR1ypGF : a, bq
Rule 2 : ñ Cd “ xCc `Ca `CR2ypGF : a, b; aq (13)
where (GF) records the antecedents of an inferred fact. It can
be seen that for inferring d, the uncertainty of a has been ac-
cumulated twice. To avoid multi-counting the uncertainty of
a fact, we can first propagate the confidence vectors of rules
14Proof of the lower and upper bound confidences under independent and
non-independent assumptions are detailed in section Appendix C.
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to conclusions (inferred facts) and store the corresponding an-
tecedents of all premises (i.e. unique values) in an inference
process; then, the confidence of each inferred fact can be cal-
culated by adding the confidence vectors of rules and unique
antecedents when inference finishes.
To implement this, a given fact d can be initialised as
“g f pCF “ CdqpCR “ rsqpGF “ rdsq”, where CF stores the
confidence vector of this fact, CR stores the accumulated con-
fidence vector of rules used to infer this fact, GF stores the
antecedents of this fact. For an inferred fact, its CR is the sum
of the CR of all its premises (based on Formula 1) and its GF is
the union of the given facts GF of all its premises. For the ex-
ample in Eq 12, the reasoning process is shown in table 3 from
top to bottom.
Table 3: Propagation of confidence vectors to avoid multi-count problem in an
example (Eq 12).
Fact CF CR GF Rule
a Ca [] [a] /
b Cb [] [b] /
c [] CR1 [a,b] R1: a^ b CR1ùñ c
d [] CR1 `CR2 ra, bs _ a R2: c^ a CR2ùñ d
Then, we can infer the confidence vector of c as Cc “ CR `
CGF “ CR1`pCa`Cbq, and Cd “ CR`CGF “ pCR1`CR2q`
Cra,bs_a “ pCR1 `CR2q ` pCa `Cbq.
In summary, the “over-counting” problem can be avoided by
checking the antecedents of all the premises of a rule and this
solution deals in part with the dependencies between premises.
Interpretation of Formula 2. For the example in Eq 12,
since the confidence in Rule 2 suggests the conditional prob-
ability Ppd|c, aq, we can obtain the joint probability Ppc, a; dq
as
Ppc, a; dq “ Ppc, aqPpd|c, aq “ PpcqPpa|cqPpd|c, aq (14)
In our system, we consider a premise a to be dependent on a
premise c if a was used for deriving c (i.e a is the antecedent of
c) and Ppa|cq “ 1; otherwise, we assume that different premises
are independent to each other (e.g. Ppa|cq “ Ppaq). Then, the
joint probability can be written as:
Ppc, a; dq “
#
Ppcq ˚ 1 ˚ Ppd|c, aq, if a is an antecedent o f c
PpcqPpaqPpd|c, aq, if a is not an antecedent o f c
(15)
In terms of kappa-calculus, the surprise of pc^a^dq happening
can be obtained using the kappa values (Equation 6) and the
addition equation 2 as:
κpc, a; dq “ κpcq ` κpa|cq ` κpd|c, aq
“
#
κpcq ` 0` κpd|c, aq, i f a is an antecedent o f c
κpcq ` κpaq ` κpd|c, aq, i f a is not an antecedent o f c
(16)
kpa|cq “ 0 means there is no surprise that a happens if we
observe c happens since a is one of the antecedents of c. Let
Q denote the set of independent premises of rule R2, then the
kappa value of the conclusion (and the premises) happening can
be written as:
κpc, a; dq “ r
ÿ
iPQ
κpiqs ` κd|c,a “ rp
ÿ
iPQ
Ciq `Cd|c,as ˚ K
“ rx
ÿ
iPQ
VUi,
ÿ
iPQ
Ui,
ÿ
iPQ
Li,
ÿ
iPQ
Viy `Cd|c,as ˚ K
(17)
So the corresponding confidence vector of the conclusion can
be derived as:
Cc,a;d “ x
ÿ
iPQ
VUi,
ÿ
iPQ
Ui,
ÿ
iPQ
Li,
ÿ
iPQ
Viy `CR2 (18)
This formula is in accordance with Formula 2; moreover the
multi-count problem has also been considered by excluding the
dependent premises.
3.4. Formula 3: combining confidence levels of the same con-
clusion derived from parallel rules.
Let CF “ xVUF ,UF , LF ,VFy denote our confidence in an
inferred fact F. If the same fact F is inferred from two separate
rules and the confidences are C1F “ xVU1,U1, L1,V1y and C2F “xVU2,U2, L2,V2y, then CF can be computed by:
CF “ minpxVU1,U1, L1,V1y, xVU2,U2, L2,V2yq (19)
where minpxVU1,U1, L1,V1y, xVU2,U2, L2,V2yq returns the
minimum of the two arguments as:
xVU1,U1, L1,V1y ă xVU2,U2, L2,V2y ðñ
pVU1 ă VU2q _ rpVU1 “ VU2q ^ pU1 ă U2qs
_ rpVU1 “ VU2q ^ pU1 “ U2q ^ pL1 ă L2qs
_ rpVU1 “ VU2q ^ pU1 “ U2q ^ pL1 “ L2q ^ pV1 ă V2qs
(20)
For example, in Figure 5 (a knowledge base with six predictive
rules), nodes in the figure represent uncertain variables, and ar-
rows represent the rules from premises to conclusions. Fact a,
Figure 5: A direct graph representing six predictive rules in a knowledge base
(shaded circles for given facts and white circles for derived facts.).
c and d are observed with confidence vectors Ca, Cc and Cd. It
can be seen from the figure that fact e can be inferred from two
different rules Rule3 (Definite) and Rule4 (Likely). Based on the
propagation Formula 1 defined in Equation 7, the confidence
vectors of e inferred separately from the two rules are:
Rule 3 : i f b, then e; C1e,b “ Cb `CR3
Rule 4 : i f h, then e; C2e,h “ Ch `CR4
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If our confidence in b is Cb “ x0, 0, 0, 1y and in h is Ch “
x0, 0, 2, 1y, based on rules CR3 “ x0, 0, 0, 0y pDe f initeq and
CR4 “ x0, 0, 1, 0y pLikelyq, we have:
C1e “ Cb `CR3 “ x0, 0, 0, 1y ` x0, 0, 0, 0y “ x0, 0, 0, 1y
C2e “ Ch `CR4 “ x0, 0, 2, 1y ` x0, 0, 1, 0y “ x0, 0, 3, 1y
Based on Formula 3 in Equation 20, the confidence vector of e
is: minpC1e ,C22y “ minpx0, 0, 0, 1y, x0, 0, 3, 1yq “ x0, 0, 0, 1y
Interpretation of Formula 3. For the above example, let the
conjunction of b and e as one event A with PpAq “ Ppb^ eq “
Ppe|bqPpbq, the conjunction of h and e as one event B with
PpBq “ Pph ^ eq “ Ppe|hqPphq, and b and h are mutually
exclusive (as shown in Figure 5). Given two mutually exclusive
events A and B and assume PpAq ě PpBq, we have:
Ppeq “ PpA_ Bq “ PpAq ` PpBq ´ PpAqPpBq
“PpAqr1` PpBqp 1
PpAq ´ 1qs ě maxpPpAq, PpBqq
(21)
As b (Rule 3) and h (Rule 4) provide two independent reasons
to believe e, the two observations together should infer e with
a belief that is stronger than either component in isolation. So
Ppeq is always larger than the maximum probability of individ-
ual event.
In terms of kappa-calculus, the surprise of e happening is
based on the smaller surprise (kappa value) of Ape ^ bq and
Bpe^ hq according to Equation 3 as:
κpeq “minpκpe, bq, κpe, hq (22)
Replacing the kappa values with confidence vectors (Equa-
tion 6), we have
κpeq “ minpCe,b ˚ K,Ce,h ˚ Kq “ minpCe,b,Ce,hq ˚ K
ñ Ce “ minpCe,b,Ce,hq
“ minpxVUA,UA, LA,VAy, xVUB,UB, LB,VByq
(23)
The minimum confidence vector is related to the maximum
probability of A and B and the derived confidence vector is in
accordance with the formula in Equation 19. Derivation of the
minimum confidence vector is detailed in Appendix B.
3.5. Rule Base Consistency Validation With Qualitative Confi-
dence Levels
In this section, a mechanism is proposed to check the con-
sistency of a rule base based on the definition of qualitative
confidence levels in Section 3.1.1. The principle is to ensure
that given a knowledge base and assuming all the rules are sat-
isfied, no contradictory conclusions will be inferred from the
same group of facts. For example, assume both fact p and its
negation  p are derived with confidence levels De f inite from
the same group of facts, since “ p is Definite” implies that “p is
Impossible”, then p (Definite) and p (Impossible) are contradic-
tory. Based on the six confidence levels defined in Table 2, six
pairs of contradictory confidence levels are defined in Table 4,
such as Definite vs Impossible.
Table 4: Contradictory confidence levels.
U VU IM
D X X X
VL X X
L X
Figure 6: A direct graph representing the predictive rules in a knowledge base
For example, if we have four rules in a rule base (Figure 6),
and A is observed with confidence vector x0, 0, 0, 0y (Definite).
Then the four rules imply that:
CB;A “ CA `CR1 “ x0, 0, 0, 0y; CD;B “ CB `CR3 “ x0, 0, 0, 1y
CC;A “ CA `CR2 “ x1, 0, 0, 0y; CD;C “ CC `CR4 “ x1, 0, 0, 0y
It can be seen that D is considered to be very likely to happen
through Rule 1 and Rule 3; but it is also considered to be very
unlikely to happen through Rule 2 and Rule 4. If such contra-
dictions are found in the rule definition phase, an alert will be
shown to domain experts; the experts can either accept these in-
consistencies15, or add more conditions on the left hand side of
the relevant rules or adjust the confidence levels of these rules.
3.6. Extended Confidence Vector for Diagnostic Rules
Rules in the system can be classified as predictive rules or
diagnostic rules. Predictive rules describe the relationship from
cause to effect (“If Cause, then Effect”); and diagnostic rules
describe the relationship from evidence to hypothesis (“If Ef-
fect, then Possible Cause”). For example, given an observed
infrastructure defect, the confidence in a predictive rule reflects
a stable property of this defect (i.e. the likelihood of a con-
sequence to happen, given the defect). In contrast, the confi-
dence in a diagnosis rule (i.e. the likelihood of a defect, given a
consequence) depends on the incidence rates of that defect and
other reasons that may cause the same consequence (Hecker-
man and Shortliffe, 1992). Generally, domain experts feel more
comfortable when asked to formulate predictive rules than di-
agnostic rules since the incidence rate of different causes (prior
probabilities) is often hard to define.
3.6.1. Extended confidence vector with an abduction count.
Although the confidence level of diagnostic/abductive rules
are hard to define, in order to warn users with all possible causes
and the potential consequences of an observation but not mix
the confidence in predictive and diagnostic rules, we extend the
15Note that, as mentioned by our domain experts, inconsistencies are not
unusual in infrastructure engineering which is one reason for the level of uncer-
tainty observed.
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qualitative confidence vectors described in the previous sections
by adding an extra element A to the front of a confidence vector,
written as:
C “ xA; VU,U, L,Vy (24)
For predictive rules, A is fixed as 0 whilst xVU,U, L,Vy are
defined by domain experts; for diagnostic rules, A is fixed as
1 whilst xVU,U, L,Vy are fixed as x0, 0, 0, 0y. For a fact, A
records how many diagnostic rules have been used for inferring
this fact, whilst xVU,U, L,Vy represent its uncertainty (either
provided at the beginning of an inference or propagated from
other facts and predictive rules). A fact is also attached with a
list of given facts (GF) and abductive facts (AF) for storing the
corresponding antecedents from predictive and diagnosis rules.
The three formulae (Eq. 7, Eq. 10 and Eq. 19) defined in pre-
vious sections also apply to the extended (ordered) confidence
vector by adding one element A into the calculation.
In our applications, predictive rules are defined by domain
experts and diagnosis rules are automatically generated by re-
versing the cause and effect. For ease of clarification, in the
following sections, we use ùñ to represent predictive rules,
and ÝÑ to represent diagnostic rules. For example, a road
crack could be triggered by several factors, such as traffic
overloading, extreme temperature (e.g. freezing), water infil-
tration into the road due to nearby road cracks and rainfall,
etc. A predictive rule “Surface deformation can cause road
cracks” can be reversed as “Road cracks could be caused by
surface deformation”, the two rules are written: “RoadDefor-
mation (Active)
x0; 0,0,0,0yùùùùùñ RoadCracking (Active)” and “Road-
Cracking (Active)
x1; 0,0,0,0yÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ RoadDeformation (Active)”.
3.6.2. Reasoning with Both Predictive and Diagnostic Rules
In practice, predictive and diagnostic rules are often used
seamlessly. For example, given a defect, we hypothesise what
is happening in the world to explain why this defect appears;
then, we apply the predictive rules to infer all consequences
potentially caused by deterioration of this defect. But if both
predictive and diagnostic rules exist in one knowledge base,
inter-causal reasoning may happen. For example, suppose we
have one predictive rule “Sprinkler (on)
De f initeùùùùñ Grass (wet)‘’
and one diagnostic rule “Grass (wet) ÝÑ Rain‘’ in a conven-
tional rule-base, if we see the sprinkler is on, chaining forward
through the rules, this will increase the belief that the grass will
be wet, which in turn increases the belief that it is raining. To
mitigate this interaction, pre-defined salience scores are added
to all the rules such that abductive inference (using diagnostic
rules) are performed first to find all possible causes of observed
facts, followed by predictive inference (using predictive rules)
to find all potential consequences. For example, as shown in
Figure 7, if road cracks are observed and the ground principal
type is sand, all possible causes of the cracks are inferred based
on diagnostic rules. The additional potential consequences of
these inferred facts are then inferred through predictive rules.
3.7. Reasoning with Missing Facts
In addition to the uncertainty in rules, the domain experts
we consulted also wanted to know what facts were assumed to
be present in the derivation of a potential consequence so they
could conduct further investigations to check whether these
missing facts hold or not (Mahesar et al., 2017). To do this,
a mechanism is provided in our system to handle incomplete
data, i.e. if any premises (facts) of an inference rule are miss-
ing16, the system will make assumptions of all possible states of
the missing facts so related rules can still be fired. These miss-
ing facts (with assumed values) are also attached to the inferred
fact as ({MF}), the same as the given facts and abduced facts.
The facts used for inferring a consequence will be displayed on
the user interface for further guidance.
In order to infer all potential consequences, assumed facts
are added into the knowledge base with all possible states of
the missing facts (e.g. subgrade type = sand/rock/clay/gravel);
these facts are combined with the rule base for reasoning. How-
ever, feeding different values of a fact (inconsistent informa-
tion) into the same knowledge base may cause inter-causal
problems since one inferred fact can be used regardless of its
justification. For example, suppose we have one given fact A
(Severe) and three rules in a knowledge base as below:
Rule 1: A is Severe ^ B is Clay Likelyùùùñ C increases;
Rule 2: A is Severe ^ B is Sand VeryLikelyùùùùùñ C increases;
Rule 3: C increases ^ B is Sand Unlikelyùùùùñ D decreases;
As A is given, the system will make two assumptions about the
missing fact B as “B is Clay“ and “B is Sand“. Ideally, we
only want rule 1 to fire to infer C pincreasesq or rule 2 and
rule 3 to fire together to infer C pincreasesq and Dpdecreasesq.
However, the C pincreasesq inferred from rule 1 will also cause
rule 3 to fire in which case “B is Clay“ and “B is Sand“ can-
not hold together. To avoid this, in Truth Maintenance System
(Reason Maintenance Systems), a dependency network is often
constructed to record the dependencies of derived facts so as
to retract the inconsistent facts at the end of inference (Doyle,
1979), but this post-processing approach may allow exponen-
tially many subsequent inconsistent facts to be inferred during
the inference process. Therefore, in our system, we avoid log-
ically inconsistent derivation on the fly by checking whether
there are any contradictory antecedents in a rule. As shown
previously in the example in Table 3, all given facts are ini-
tialised by including themselves in the given fact list, whilst all
assumed facts (missing facts) are initialised by adding them-
selves in the missing fact list. For the above example, since
C pIncreasesqtGFrApS evereqs,MFrBpClayqsu is not consis-
tent with BpS andq tMFrBpS andqsu, rule 3 will not fire with
the C inferred from rule 1. This step can guarantee that each
derived fact has a consistent antecedents.
Maximally consistent sets of assumptions. With the con-
clusions (e.g. consequences in our ATU-DSS) inferred from
different combinations of given and assumed facts, we need to
group consistent consequences based on different assumptions:
1) firstly, an adjacency matrix (undirected graph) of all conse-
quences is generated: two consequences are connected if they
16Currently, in order to limit the number of assumptions made, at least one
premise of a rule must be not assumed.
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Figure 7: An example of city infrastructure assessment with diagnosis and predictive inference. Colour scheme: turquoise for input facts, white for inferred facts,
and light blue for final conclusions.
are with consistent antecedents (i.e. no fact hold different val-
ues); 2) then, all maximal cliques in this undirected graph are
identified, in each of which consequences are consistent and
the clique cannot be extended by including one more adjacent
vertex. Whilst typically systems would choose a preferred set
of assumptions automatically based on certain criteria, we are
looking at all sets simultaneously and our user interface in the
prototype will let users compare the reasoning chains of dif-
ferent consequences and decide which group of assumptions is
more reasonable (Figure 12).
4. A Prototype Decision Support System for Urban Infras-
tructure Inter-asset Management
A prototype has been developed based on the uncertain rea-
soning approach and the ATU ontologies presented in previous
sections. The system architecture is shown in Figure 8. It in-
cludes a data layer, a logic lager and an interface layer. In the
following sections, we will first introduce the ATU-DSS rule
base, then present the data sources, and finally present the user
interface and demonstrate how to use the system with an ex-
ample. A video demonstrating the prototype is available at:
http://bit.ly/2MRHMCc 17.
17Accessed: 2020-02-23
4.1. Developing a Rule-Base for ATU-DSS based on Scenarios
Since the information needed to be encoded as rules in ATU-
DSS is very extensive and the time of domain experts is pre-
cious, we adopted a scenario-based strategy for rule base de-
velopment. First, several representative scenarios were selected
by our domain experts, such as rainfall with road cracking and
underground pipe leakage with active traffic loading. New sce-
narios can be added gradually subsequently. Then, for each
scenario, rules were defined by domain experts by following
the deterioration process of assets and considering all contex-
tual possibilities. The flowcharts of these processes were sent to
external domain experts and practitioners for validation. For ex-
ample, in a scenario about rainfall with road cracking, the rele-
vant variables include road construction properties, road crack-
ing depth, rainfall duration/intensity and subgrade (ground)
type. If the road surface is cracked and the cracks extend to
the underlying road base, then any rainfall event will lead to
infiltration into the road construction and underlying subgrade;
if the subgrade is clay and the ground water level is low, it is
likely that the ground water level will rise softening the clay; if
the subgrade is a soluble rock it is possible that solution cavities
could form, etc.
Rules with confidence levels were first created by domain
experts in an agreed format and stored in text files; then they
were automatically converted to a format recognisable by infer-
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Figure 8: A three-layer system architecture of the ATU-DSS prototype.
ence engines using a piece of code written in Python. We used
the rule inference engine Jess18 in our prototype (this can be
interchanged with CLIPS19 or other rule engines) for rule im-
plementation and reasoning. A full-length exemplar code and
explanations are in Appendix D. Diagnosis rules were also au-
tomatically generated by inverting the predictive rules.
4.2. Data Sources and Spatial criteria for Data Retrieval
Informed by the ATU ontologies and rules, various infras-
tructure and contextual datasets were sourced from different
owners (e.g. UK Met Office, UK Department for Transport,
British Geological Survey, utility companies) and integrated in
the prototype system to provide instant location/time specific
data retrieval. The sourced datasets are mostly in (or converted
to) the form of GIS tables and stored in a PostgreSQL database.
The Meteorological data is sourced from the UK Met Of-
fice20. When a trigger is reported through the system user inter-
face, the 30-day weather data (e.g. daily/hourly rainfall, max-
imum and minimum air/concrete/soil temperatures) up to the
occurrence day of the trigger is calculated based on the data
from its nearby (less than 10km away) weather stations. His-
toric flood outline map is also sourced from the UK Environ-
ment Agency to provide the information of flood risk around
the site of the trigger. Weather forecast data may also be added
in the future.
The Road and Traffic Information is sourced from the UK
Department for Transport 21 and Ordnance Survey. For a re-
ported trigger, its nearest road segment is first retrieved from
the road network database to identify the corresponding traf-
fic counting point for obtaining the historical traffic data, based
18http://www.jessrules.com/jess/docs/71/. Accessed: 2020-02-
23.
19http://clipsrules.sourceforge.net/. Accessed: 2020-02-23.
20Met Office Integrated Data Archive System (MIDAS) Land and Marine
Surface Stations Data (1853-current)
21UK Department for Transport (DfT) Traffic Statistics.
on which the weighted annual traffic on this road is calculated
according to the wear factors of seven types of heavy vehi-
cles (e.g. buses)22. The road designed traffic loading can be
provided by external road datasets (e.g. the National Street
Gazetteer) or added by users. By comparing the traffic volume
on a road with the average volume in the locality, the impor-
tance of this road can be assessed, which is also an indicator of
the effect that the trigger and subsequent consequences or mit-
igation measures could have on the traffic flow. The past and
future planned roadworks on this road are also retrieved (data
from Highways England website23) to help evaluate the vulner-
ability of the road system.
The Ground Conditions data (e.g. ground water level, ge-
ological faults) is sourced from the British Geological Sur-
vey (BGS) and local councils. For example, the BGS 50K
dataset24 provides geological information like superficial and
bedrock geology; the corrosivity dataset25 gives an indication
as to whether the ground conditions below the top soil are likely
to cause corrosion of underground iron asset, and the SuDS26
dataset suggests the potential presence of geological and hydro-
geological hazards that could be initiated or worsened by water
infiltration to the ground. Brownfield information sourced from
different local councils is also added in the system.
Buried utilities data is sourced from different asset owners
(e.g. United Utilities, National Grid, North West Electricity),
vectorised and integrated in a back-end spatial database27, in
22UK Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (2006)
23https://data.gov.uk/dataset/5b3267d8-4307-4eef-a9af-
3a4c28224694/planned-road-works-on-the-he-road-network.
Accessed: 2020-02-23.
24http://www.bgs.ac.uk/products/digitalmaps/digmapgb_50.
html. Accessed: 2020-02-23.
25http://www.bgs.ac.uk/products/groundconditions/
corrosivity.html. Accessed: 2020-02-23.
26http://www.bgs.ac.uk/suds/. Accessed: 2020-02-23.
27For proof-of-concept purpose only. In the UK, automated retrieval of utility
statutory records is only available in Scotland with the VAULT system.
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which multiple attributes of the buried assets are recorded (e.g.
utility type, location, depth, material, diameter, pressure/volt-
age, year of installation, owners, operation status). Based on the
location of a reported trigger, data of buried utilities in the gen-
eral vicinity of this trigger (within a 200m radius) is retrieved
from the database (Figure 11(a)).
Nearby Services. Information of the nearby services such as
hospitals, schools, banks, is also important for estimating the
potential social and economic impact of a trigger. For example,
the people at schools and hospitals may be more vulnerable to
harm and harder to evacuate in an emergency, such as a gas
explosion due to damage to a gas pipe. The data of sensitive
services around a trigger (ď 2km) is fetched from the Open-
StreetMap when a trigger is reported (Figure 11(b)). To assess
the potential impact on each service, their shortest driving dis-
tances to the trigger is calculated using the widely used path
planning A* algorithm.
Mapping Data to ATU Ontology Concepts. The sourced data
is mapped to corresponding ontology concepts based on a pre-
defined correspondence table so that it can be used for inference
together with the logical rules.
Although automatic methods exist for matching data and on-
tologies (Munir and Anjum, 2018), in our case, all the corre-
spondences were manually defined by experts to guarantee their
correctness. We carefully read the related documents of each
dataset, especially their definitions, the meaning of each table
column (or attribute, field), the data unit, and how the value in
each cell was derived. Some examples of mapping are given
below:
- For some cases, the name of a data table (or a column)
can be similar to an ontology concept, which gives a hint to
find the correct match. For example, the table column length
in the OS Open Roads Dataset28 (table uk road network) also
suggests the length of a road segment, thus can be mapped to
the ontology concept RoadLength in the Road Ontology;
- But for some cases, similar names may not suggest a correct
correspondence. For example, there exists a geological dataset
Depth to water table29 and an ontology concept GroundWa-
terTableDepth in the Ground Ontology. The two names look
similar but the depth data cannot be mapped to the ontology
concept as the data values were not the real depth but cate-
gorised into [1, 2, 3] (1: ą 5m below ground surface; 2: 3-5m
below ground surface; 3: ă 3m below ground surface);
- For some cases, there are no similarities between the names,
correspondences can only be established after checking the def-
inition of data and ontology concepts. For example, the table
column Function in the OS Open Roads Dataset can be mapped
to the ontology concept RoadType in the Road Ontology be-
cause both of them give the information of road types such as
A road, B road, etc. Another example is about a geological
dataset called GroundWaterLevels30. Its document suggests that
28https://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/business-government/
products/open-map-roads.Accessed:2020-03-01.
29http://www.bgs.ac.uk/suds/. Accessed: 2020-02-23.
30https://www.bgs.ac.uk/products/hydrogeology/
depthToGroundwater.html. Accessed: 2020-02-23.
Figure 9: Workflow in the ATU-DSS (from the left to right) (Wei et al., 2018).
this dataset provides the information of depth to groundwater
level and the unit of its table column Value is in metres which is
the same as the definition of the ontology concept GroundWa-
terTableDepth, therefore, a correspondence is established be-
tween them.
All these correspondence relations are stored in a predefined
correspondence table (Table 5).
Table 5: A predefined correspondence table between data and ontologies.
externalData name externalData column ontologyConcept
uk road network length RoadLength
uk road network Function RoadType
GroundWaterLevels Value GroundWaterTableDepth
... ... ...
4.3. ATU-DSS User Interface
For ease or use, a web-based user interface has been devel-
oped using Python Django, Geoserver and openLayers. The
workflow of utilising ATU-DSS is shown in Figure 9, includ-
ing four steps: first users can access the system from standard
web browsers to report new triggers by providing the trigger
type and properties; then, relevant contextual information is re-
trieved from local or online databases; after that, the retrieved
data is both displayed on the user interface and fed into the rule
engine to infer potential consequences with their associated un-
certainty, severity levels and antecedents. Finally, the system
also gives suggestions on how to get the missing data and sup-
ports alternative assessment.
For example, assuming that:
A member of the public observes a water pipe leakage
and phones up the local authority to report it!
In order to estimate the potential consequences of this trigger,
the local authority first need to report the leakage through the
user interface:
´ Reporting new triggers. Users can either report a trigger
by manually typing the information (Figure 10), or uploading
an XML file containing the information of triggers. The second
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Figure 10: User interface for reporting new triggers with a drop-down menu of trigger types ( c©OSM)
option allows ATU-DSS to be connected with other existing in-
formation systems, such as the pothole reporting systems used
in a lot of local councils, and to use external data sources as trig-
gers to start the decision support process. When manually re-
porting a trigger, the trigger type can be selected from a type list
(defined in the Trigger Ontology) as shown in Figure 10. The
trigger severity level (High, Medium, Low), geographic location
(e.g. postcode, GPS coordinates, location pinpointed by users
on the displayed map, or an uploaded spatial file, Figure 10)
and time should also be provided. Users can also upload multi-
ple photos of a trigger at different times to help analyse/monitor
the development of this trigger.
´ Localised Data Retrieval and Automated Reasoning.
Then, the relevant localised contextual data of the reported trig-
ger is automatically retrieved based on its occurrence location
and time using different spatial criteria. The retrieved/processed
data is displayed on the user interface (Figure 11). The data pro-
vided by users (e.g. trigger information) and data retrieved from
the database is written as a fact file (e.g. GroundPrincipalType
(Clay), EnvironmentRainfallDuration (Long)), then fed into the
rule engine for automated reasoning of potential consequences.
´ Identification of Potential consequences. Once the reason-
ing process finishes, potential consequences are identified from
the inferred facts. Currently we are looking at four types of
consequences in ATU-DSS, including consequences on buried
utilities (e.g. utility fail), on roads (e.g. road collapse), on
ground (e.g. ground collapse) and social/economic/environ-
mental/legal consequences (e.g. traffic disruption, loss of busi-
ness, loss of utility service, damage to property, injury, and loss
of life). Each consequence has five attributes attached: un-
certainty level, severity level, given facts tGFu, missing infor-
mation tMFu and consequence type (e.g. ground, social/eco-
nomic)31.
31Note: as no other causes of pipe leakage is provided by domain experts for
The uncertainty level, given facts and missing facts of
a consequence are propagated/accumulated from the uncer-
tainty reasoning approach, whilst the severity level (Negligible,
Marginal, Critical, Catastrophic) of a consequence is context
dependent and defined in each logical rule. For example, if road
deformation happens on a road, the severity of potential traffic
disruption is only marginal; but if a pipe burst happens on a
road, the potential traffic disruption can be critical. Knowing
the likelihood and severity of potential consequences of a re-
ported trigger can help users to prioritise their tasks and take ap-
propriate mitigation measures to reduce the potential risks, es-
pecially for those with higher likelihood and (or) higher sever-
ity.
´ Visualisation of the Potential Consequences. The uncer-
tainty level of potential consequences can be shown to users as
a confidence vector or using a textual representation. In this
work, the textual representation is obtained by taking the first
element in the xVU, U, L, Vy vector with a non-zero value
since we assume an order-of-magnitude semantics for the con-
fidence vectors, i.e. the left-most component is more surprising
than the next unless there were a huge number of rules applied
to get the first value (Appendix A). For example, for an in-
ferred fact with a confidence vector x0, 0, 2, 1y, since 2 on the
position of Likely is the first non-zero value, this fact is consid-
ered as Likely to happen. To meet the different needs of users,
two views have been designed in ATU-DSS for visualising the
potential consequences:
The first option is to display the consequences in an impact
matrix table (Figure 12) according to their severity levels/im-
pact and uncertainty level/likelihood. The number of missing
facts (if there are any) used for deducing a certain consequence
is also displayed behind each consequence. As we make as-
the current prototype, the abductive reasoning results are not shown.
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(a) Underground utilities around the trigger.
(b) Nearby services.
Figure 11: Snapshots of the user interface with a list of retrieved contextual data (background maps (a) Google Satellite Image, (b) OpenStreetMap).
sumptions of all possible values of missing facts, multiple in-
stances of the same consequence (e.g. utility fail) could be de-
rived from different sets of facts and with different likelihood.
To ease the analysis by users, we have added several filtering
boxes on the right panel of the matrix view so that users can
either filter consequences based on their categories (e.g. so-
cial consequences) or combinations of different assumptions.
When users hover the mouse on one consequence in the risk ta-
ble, other duplicate consequences are also highlighted; a tooltip
will also appear to show the facts used to derive the hovered
consequence (Figure 12) .
The second option is a list view (Figure 13) in which con-
sequences and their related parameters (e.g. confidence vec-
tor, likelihood, severity, number of missing facts, data used) are
displayed in a table and can be sorted according to different at-
tributes. It should be noted that by keeping elements in the con-
fidence vectors with the same length, the alphabetically sorting
algorithm used in an html table is the same as the formula for
confidence vector comparison defined in Equation 20.
´ Reasoning Chain of Potential Consequences. Users can
explore the details of each potential consequence by clicking on
the links in the risk view or the list view. The system can give
explanations of each consequence in the form of a sequence of
text descriptions or as a network diagram of nodes and directed
arcs. For example, the reasoning chain of a potential utility sup-
port decrease caused by a reported pipe leakage is illustrated in
Figure 14, in which the colour of ellipses indicates whether a
fact is given, assumed or inferred; and the arrows indicate the
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Figure 12: The impact matrix view for visualisation of the potential consequences of a reported pipe leakage. There are several filtering options on the user interface:
a) users can select different combinations of assumptions of the missing facts from the multi-checkboxes on the right panel and the corresponding consequences
will be shown in the impact matrix table (N.B. colours in the table are assigned based on generic heuristics); the facts used to infer a specific consequence are shown
with a mouse-over effect in a tooltip; b) users can also filter the consequences to be displayed by their categories (e.g. road, social/economic consequences); c) users
can click on a consequence and more details will be shown in a new page.
Figure 13: The list view for visualisation of potential consequences of a given trigger. Consequences in the table can be sorted according to different attributes.
reasoning flow together with the likelihood of each rule. By
showing users the reasoning process of arriving at a particular
consequence, the system can help users make a more reason-
able and confident decision. Users can also manually update
(e.g. decrease) the confidence and severity levels of a conse-
quence based on their expert opinion.
´ Investigation Suggestions for Collecting and Updating
Missing Data. As mentioned previously, in cases where real
data is missing in the reasoning process of a potential con-
sequence, the system will suggest suitable investigation tech-
niques to get the missing data based on the ATU Investigation
Ontology (Figure 16). Users can decide whether to accept the
assumed value of a missing fact or to do some investigation and
update the data later (Figure 16). When new data is added/up-
dated, the whole reasoning process automatically re-activates.
We designed this function since it is often rare to have com-
plete datasets in an information system. Even if such datasets
do exist, they are subject to change or the observations from
different people may vary. For example, the system may sug-
gest that the ground type at a specific location is Sand, but one
user may suggest the ground type as Clay based on his/her in-
vestigation. In ATU-DSS, the value of a fact can be updated
no matter whether it is retrieved from the database or provided
by a user. The system records which user makes a modification
so that the provenance of all data is recorded. The ability for
users to see alternative results by modifying assumptions can
help users understand better the impact of a trigger in different
context.
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Figure 14: Example of a consequence reasoning chain. Colour scheme in the figure: turquoise for given facts, pink for assumed facts (missing facts), white for
intermediate facts and yellow for the final output
´ Modification of Rule Likelihood for Case-based Analysis.
The same as we may have different measurements of a fact,
different experts may have different opinions of the content (e.g.
likelihood) of a rule. Therefore, our system not only provides
a common rule base for all scenarios, it also allows users to
modify/personalise these rules. As shown in Figure 15(a), users
can click on the likelihood of a certain rule; then, a separate
page will be shown (Figure 15(b)). On this page, users can
select the new rule likelihood from a drop-down list and add
their comments or explanations. Once submitted, this rule will
replace the original rule in this case study (i.e. this specific
trigger) and the whole reasoning process re-activates32. The
re-reasoning step is essential since the modified rule may have
also been used for inferring other potential consequences. User
can notice whether a rule has been modified in this scenario
by the colour of likelihood on a reasoning graph: the original
ones are in blue while the modified ones are shown in red. The
modification history of each rule will be recorded and shown on
the bottom of the page so users can see others’ insights.
4.4. Computational Complexity
We used the rule inference engine Jess for rule implemen-
tation and reasoning in the prototype. As Jess uses an im-
32It should be noted that when a new trigger is added, only the original rule
base will be used
proved Rete algorithm (Forgy, 1982) for reasoning, the perfor-
mance is largely independent of the number of rules/facts, but
as we are also dealing with missing facts, the computational
time of different scenarios will depend on the number of miss-
ing facts in the antecedents of a rule and the possible values of
each missing fact, as well as the similar patterns of rules’ LHS
(left hand side) in the knowledge base. Therefore, it is always
a good practice to put the most specific patterns near the top
of each rule’s LHS. The system currently comprises 377 pre-
dictive rules and each rule has 4 antecedents in average; the
most complex rule has 12 antecedents and the simplest rule
has two antecedents. For the pipe leaking scenario illustrated
in Figure 12, two facts were provided (PipeLeaking (Active),
PipeLeakingRate (Severe)), two facts were retrieved (RoadType
(A class road), TrafficLoad (Active)), and three missing facts
were assumed with possible values: PipeDepth (Deep) (Shal-
low), RoadSlope (High) (Medium) (Slight), Subgrade (Clay)
(Sand) (SolubleRock). 235 facts were inferred from different
combinations of facts and 65 were identified as potential conse-
quences. The maximum depth of inference is 22 and the mini-
mum depth is only one. The inference, data tidying and figure
rendering process took about 4 seconds on a laptop with an Intel
2.7-GHz processor.
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(a) User interface for displaying the reasoning process of a potential consequence. Users can click on a fact to change its value or check its modification history. User
can also click on the likelihood of a rule to modify it.
(b) User interface for modifying the likelihood of a rule. The modification history of this rule is also recorded and displayed.
Figure 15: User interface for displaying and modifying the likelihood of a rule.
4.5. Evaluation
In addition to test the system with several real scenarios (e.g.
the pipe leaking scenario presented in previous sections), we
have also evaluated users’ acceptance of the system by demon-
strating the ATU-DSS prototype to a wide range of potential
users in two workshops and collecting their feedback. The first
workshop was organised in September 2017 to assess the sys-
tem framework and user interface design. The participants in-
cluded one invited experienced utility manager, one utility sur-
veyor trainers, and around twenty academics from different UK
universities and institutions (with diverse backgrounds such as
civil engineering, geotechnical engineering, geophysics, com-
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Table 6: Users’ feedback about the ATU-DSS from a user workshop
Questions Users’ responseCategory Sample responses from workshop participants
1. What excites
you about the
ATU-DSS?
Integrated data
platform
“The pool of information on a single platform, from the output his seems limitless which is very exciting”
“A one step location for critical information”
“by having a system with the potential to show and provide all records and local specific information is a huge
benefit”
Help estimate
potential
consequences
through
automated
reasoning
“Ability to determine the impact of an incident in a short period of time and consider vulnerability of all assets“
“Bring expert analysis across a consistent analysis / reasoned approach”
‘Help to better visualise cause and effect in relation to understanding temporal spatial correlation between utility
and road problems”
“Identifying real and potential future problems from what may appear an insignificant trigger “
“The opportunity for decisions on interventions on different utilities / highway authorities assets based on ratio-
nal reasoning”
Smart city/
Minimise
disruption
“Potential tool to help reduce streetworks disruption by improving the decisions made to arrive at appropriate
responses and associated consequences (vulnerabilities)“
“This moves to smart cities, e.g. Barcelona”
Human learning “Opportunities for convergence for expert feedback ““Useful for training, education“
2. Is this useful for you
or somebody you can
think of?
Practitioners
(Local authority/
Asset owner/
Survey
Company/
Consultancy)
“Incident manager“, “Senior Management”, “survey companies developers”
“The asset owner to prioritise their spend and its justification”
“definitely for our customers; power utilities / water utility, etc., and Highways England. Also for constructors.
Safety!”
“Business decision makers, contract managers, consultant analysis specialists, CDM(Construction, Design and
Management) managers”
General public “possibly accountable to member / public who sees a trigger““Should this be available to the general public – “Google disaster”?”
3. How is this related to
your practice?
Incident and risk
management
“The ability for risk management to support the delivery validation of the build, safety, environment, and all
other factors ”
Installation design “most likely use is for design; need to acquire knowledge of design decisions “
Utility location,
condition survey
“We are surveying practitioner, the more information we have available to use, the better judgement and decision
we can make “
“We can provide additional local information Use of EM/GPR survey technologies to get best outcome data in
important, high risk scenarios”
Education/training “‘Useful for training“
4. Does it address any
specific challenges you
are facing?
Yes
“Yes, by having a system with the potential to show and provide all records and local specific information is a
huge benefit”
“Helps consultancy sales / training best practice decision making for customers. Leading to ROI decision
making in equipment investment decisions”
“Provide different choices for surveying or monitoring approaches, and subsequent selection of techniques”
Potentially yes “Not at the present time. Current practice is so far behind the presented ideas that it is hard to imagine it in use
for xx years yet. ”
Figure 16: Interface for suggesting the investigation techniques for obtaining
a missing fact (e.g. Ground Cavity), where 0 = Not considered applicable; 1
= limited use; 2 = used or could be used, but not best approach or has limita-
tions; 3 = excellent potential but not fully developed; 4 = generally considered
an excellent approach, techniques well developed. There are also two buttons
linking to two different pages for updating the data value
puter science). An overview of the decision support system
(including the framework, data and underlying semantic tech-
nologies) was given at the beginning of the workshop, followed
by a live demonstration with real data from a historic ground
collapse in Manchester which caused major disruption. After
that, feedback from participants was acquired via a plenary dis-
cussion. The participants showed great interest and generally
praised the effectiveness of the system, especially the rich data
provided, the transparency of the reasoning module and the in-
formative investigation suggestions. Several suggestions were
received regarding the user interface design (e.g. colour in the
matrix table, legend).
The second workshop was organised in November 2017 and
attracted attendees from various backgrounds, e.g. local author-
ities, utility companies, survey companies, contractors (utility
pipe lining/design), risk managers, sensor manufacturing com-
panies, individual consultants, academics. The workshop fol-
lowed the same procedure as the first one, except that feedback
from participants was acquired via individual questionnaires
as well as a plenary discussion. In the questionnaire (avail-
able at http://bit.ly/2oL7MAt)33, participants were asked
whether the prototype addressed key problems in their practice
33Accessed: 2020-02-23.
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and whether it would fit into their current work. 18 question-
naires were collected - some sample responses from the par-
ticipants are shown in Table 6. Among these questionnaires,
ten participants answered the question “Is this useful for you
or somebody you can think of ?” and suggested that this sys-
tem can be a potentially useful tool for different stakeholders,
such as incident managers, survey company developers, con-
structors, asset owners, local authority. Possible tasks included
risk mitigation, prioritisation and justification of asset design
and maintenance expenses and activities. The participants also
pointed out that the system could be useful for the general pub-
lic and could have the potential benefits for training novice or
junior staff in streetworks management. Eight people did not
answer this question but their responses in questions “How is
this related to your practice ?” and “Does it address any spe-
cific challenges you are facing ?” indicated that the DSS was
not directly relevant to them because they were from a com-
pany selling sensors, were academics, or in one case because
“current practice is so far behind the presented ideas that it is
hard to imagine it in use for xx years yet”. Regarding the spe-
cific functions of the system, the users were particularly inter-
ested in the integrated data platform that brought various criti-
cal contextual data together. The participants suggested that the
automated reasoning module was useful for helping determine
the impact of an incident in a short period of time, identify po-
tential consequences from seemingly insignificant triggers and
potentially reduce the streetworks disruptions. One participant
was particularly pleased with the visualisation of the reasoning
chain, which could help users to better understand the cause
and effect in relation to understanding spatio-temporal correla-
tion between utility and road problems.
As for future improvements of the system, participants sug-
gested to add additional data sources, such as bus routes, agri-
culture data, and archaeological data. It was also recommended
to develop a smart phone application for easier access to the
system. We are encouraged by the number of new stakeholders
interested in the system since the workshop and are exploring
further case studies (e.g. diagnosing leaking pipes, surveyor
training, route planning for street excavations) under a recently
started follow-on impact acceleration project.
5. Discussion
In this section, we discuss the key challenges we met and
lessons we learned from building the above knowledge-driven
decision support system for urban infrastructure inter-asset
management, as well as the advantages and limitations of the
proposed framework.
5.1. Distributed and Integrated Rule Base Development
In order to predict the future behaviour of infrastructure
assets, in this work, we captured the asset dependencies us-
ing rules. However, it is not feasible to create an exhaustive
rule base for urban infrastructure management, especially when
working with few domain experts whose time is extremely valu-
able. In this work, we created a rule base with two scenar-
ios to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed reasoning
and decision supporting framework. For larger scale applica-
tions, rule bases can be created by different experts or organi-
sations (e.g. industry) for different scenarios/applications in a
distributed manner. Importantly, the ATU ontologies can pro-
vide a common language to facilitate this process. We have
discussed the problem of rule base inconsistency in section 3.5
by assuming that all rules were created with the same confi-
dence levels. However, in practice, different experts may have
different understanding of a probability phrase (Wallsten and
Budescu, 1995) and these phrases tend to change their mean-
ings in different contexts. Future work is required to investi-
gate how to combine/align the rules created by several domain
experts (inter-variances) and the rules created by the same do-
main experts at different times (intra-variances) or in different
context.
5.2. Transferability to Other Applications
In this work, we provided a framework for developing
knowledge-driven DSSs based on ontologies and rules with
qualitative confidences. This framework can be adapted for
various engineering applications, which require a system-of-
systems thinking and qualitative uncertainties. Since users can
change data values and compare different alternatives with ex-
planations, the system framework can also be used for train-
ing less experienced engineers to perform complex decision
making that requires multi-sector knowledge. In addition to
the above applications, the system can be used as an evidence
base to store all reported triggers, decisions/mitigation made by
users, and the actual consequences for sharing experiences and
lessons learned.
5.3. System Maintenance: Balancing Rule-driven and Data-
driven Approaches in Long Term
For building a decision support system for infrastructure
management, both the historic and current data is important. As
the historic data of infrastructure behaviours is not often avail-
able or can be incomplete, it is practical by starting working
with domain experts to identify the key data/knowledge and
encode the essential process rules (i.e. cause and effect) in
representative situations. It should be noted that these hand-
crafted rules are not immutable, instead they are only used as
the starting points to understand a domain, especially how a
domain expert would evaluate the risk/potential consequences
from certain observations, such as the level of details of knowl-
edge they used and the order of their inference. As more data
is gradually available, especially in the context of Internet-of-
Things as more smart sensors are installed to monitor the cities,
the hand-crafted rules could be used to guide quantitative/logic
rules learning and to validate the existing rules provided by do-
main experts. Another function our system provides is to let
users to specialise a rule by modifying the rule likelihood (or
adding more conditions, deleting a rule) in their applications,
enabling a case-based analysis. When more feedback (i.e. mod-
ifications and comments) is collected from different users, the
users’ feedback will be used to update the original likelihood of
a rule in the knowledge base or to further delineate the rule in
different conditions.
21
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Moreover, data is also important for inference (or predic-
tion) of potential consequences. As commented by the stake-
holders (decision makers) participated in the ATU-DSS work-
shops, bringing together different types of relevant data on one
data platform greatly simplifies the data collection procedure
for them, which is particularly useful in emergency situations.
However, in practice, the availability of relevant datasets is still
limited though we have tried our best to include as many open
datasets and private licensed datasets as possible. For this rea-
son, our system also provides an interface to other existing data
warehouses using API34 and allows users to manually upload
their previous project data or records (e.g. previous geophys-
ical survey results, private borehole scans) into the system for
reuse in the future projects. The increase of data sources may
also lead to another challenge related to data redundancy, i.e.
the same asset information (e.g. buried utilities) being pro-
vided by multiple data sources. Further investigation is needed
to decide whether performing data fusion to assert one unified
value into the inference engine (Dou et al., 2016), or resolv-
ing the data redundancy problem inside the inference engine.
Furthermore, data can have different granularity and semantics,
which may not accord with the definition of ontology concepts
or rules. Currently, mapping between the datasets and ATU on-
tology concepts is manually performed to ensure quality but in
future work it would be useful to investigate how to automat-
ically source relevant datasets from the internet and link them
to the system ontologies to make the system more powerful, al-
though there is a possibility that data discrepancy will increase.
6. Conclusion
In this work we have presented a novel knowledge-based de-
cision support system for integrated urban infrastructure inter-
asset management - it provides a systematic way to handle in-
terdependencies between different infrastructure assets and to
model both the uncertainty and incompleteness of data and
knowledge. A web-based prototype system has also been de-
veloped with several visualisation functions so that users can
easily access the system through a standard web browser for re-
porting new triggers, examining contextual data and interacting
with the system for alternative analysis of the potential conse-
quences. The collected feedback from external domain experts
suggested that the reasoning processes (rules) in ATU-DSS and
the estimated consequence are appropriate for current practice.
Users’ feedback collected from two workshops showed that the
system is widely recognised as easy to fit into their current prac-
tice and will be helpful for quickly obtaining contextual data
and inferring potential consequences of triggers based on multi-
sector knowledge.
In summary the paper has made the following novel contri-
butions:
• We have presented the first Decision Support System
which allows integrated, holistic decision support for
34An external system providing buried utility searching service: https://
www.linesearchbeforeudig.co.uk/. Accessed: 2020-02-23.
streetworks, presenting the user with integrated data and
a qualitative risk table;
• We have formalised and developed an inference system for
qualitative confidence levels which can be combined with
inference system which allows assumptions to be made
and tracked;
• A set of ontologies for the streetworks domain and related
domains (in particular an environment and sensor ontol-
ogy) were proposed;
• A web based system has been built and received positive
user feedback.
As future work, we will continue to expand the current sys-
tem by considering other scenarios included in the Trigger On-
tology, such as potholes and different types of construction
works. Since these scenarios share similar contextual informa-
tion, such as weather and traffic, the major work to extend the
current system is to develop relevant rule sets of each scenario
by collaborating with relevant domain experts. More datasets
may also need to be added if more factors are considered in
different rule sets. Qualitative temporal information will also
be added into the knowledge base for more informative anal-
ysis. As anybody could help take responsibility for maintain-
ing a sustainable street infrastructure system, the general public
could also get involved into the system as citizen sensors.
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Appendix A. Approximate the confidence level from a con-
fidence vector.
Although a confidence vector can already represent the prob-
ability of a fact/rule and is convenient to be used during infer-
ence, for the inferred facts, we may need to convert them to a
concise textural representation using one of the confidence lev-
els (Impossible, Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, Very Likely,
Definite) so they are understandable to users. As the corre-
sponding probability of a confidence vector C “ xVU,U, L,Vy
can be calculated as p “ aVU1 ¨aU2 ¨aL3 ¨aV4 , ta1, a2, a3, a4u P p0, 1q
and tVU,U, L,Vu are non-negative integers, p is smaller than
the smallest component of aVU1 , a
U
2 , a
L
3 , a
V
4 , noted as
p ď minpaxii q (A.1)
Since a1 ă a2 ă a3 ă a4, when the reasoning chain is rela-
tively shallow (i.e. VU, U, L, V are small integers), an approx-
imation of p is to take the left-most element of ai with non-zero
value. For example, in a confidence vector of an inferred fact is
C “ x0, 1, 0, 0y, the left-most non-zero element is 1 in the posi-
tion of “Unlikely”, so its confidence level can be approximated
as “Unlikely”. In some occasions, if the reasoning chain is quite
deep (i.e. the confidence vector of an inferred fact is with large
values), the position of the left-most non-zero element may not
well present the confidence level of this fact. For example, in
a confidence vector C “ x0, 0, 0, 600y, the left-most non-zero
element is 600 in the position of “Very Likely”, but as it has ac-
cumulated 600 times, it might be better viewed as “Unlikely”.
The boundary of shallow and deep chains can be analysed
by selecting numerical values for a1, a2, a3, a4. For example,
when the “Very Likely” component is actually less likely than
the “Likely” component, we can have:
aV3 ă amaxp1,Lq2 ñ lnpaV3 q ă lnpamaxp1,Lq2 q (A.2)
ñ V ¨ lnpa3q ă maxp1, Lq ¨ lnpa2q (A.3)
7 lnpa3q ă 0 ñ Vmaxp1, Lq ą
lnpa2q
lnpa3 q (A.4)
So if Vmaxp1,Lq is larger than lnpa2q{lnpa3q, the correspond-
ing confidence level of this fact should be “Likely” instead
of “Very Likely”. Similarly, as shown in Table A.7, when
L
maxp1,Uq is larger than lnpa1q{lnpa2q, or Vmaxp1,Uq is larger than
lnpa1q{lnpa3q, the corresponding confidence level of this fact
should be “Unlikely” instead of “Likely”. When different nu-
meric values are selected for a1, a2, a3 and a4, the thresholds
vary. For example, if we consider a1 “ 0.05, a2 “ 0.3, a3 “
0.7, a4 “ 0.95 for Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, Very Likely,
the criteria in the table can be written as:$’’’’’&’’’’’%
VeryUnlikely, i f p Umaxp1,VUq ą 3q _ p Lmaxp1,VUq ą 10q
_ Vmaxp1,VUq ą 193
Unlikely, i f p Lmaxp1,Uq ą 3^ Lmaxp1,VUq ă 10q _
pp Vmaxp1,Uq ą 59^ Vmaxp1,VUq ă 193qq
Likely, i f p Vmaxp1,Lq ą 17^ Vmaxp1,Uq ă 59q
(A.5)
24
24
Minimum ele-
ment probability
Threshold criteria Approximate
confidence level
aL2 ă amaxp1,VUq1 Umaxp1,VUq ą lnpa1q{lnpa2q VU (Very Un-
likely)
aV3 ă amaxp1,VUq1 Lmaxp1,VUq ą lnpa1q{lnpa3q VU (Very Un-
likely)
aL4 ă amaxp1,VUq1 Vmaxp1,VUq ą lnpa1q{lnpa4q VU (Very Un-
likely)
aV3 ă amaxp1,Uq2 Lmaxp1,Uq ą lnpa2q{lnpa3q U (Unlikely)
aV4 ă amaxp1,Uq2 Vmaxp1,Uq ą lnpa2q{lnpa4q U (Unlikely)
aV4 ă amaxp1,Lq3 Vmaxp1,Lq ą lnpa3q{lnpa4q L (Likely)
Table A.7: The confidence level of a confidence vector can be approximated
with the position of the first non-zero value of {VU,U, L, V} from left to right
unless the above criteria in the first/second columns are satisfied.
In this case, a fact with confidence C1 “ x0, 1, 0, 3y can be
considered as Unlikely since its leftmost non-zero element is
U “ 1 and the criteria in Equation A.5 are not satisfied; but
for C4 “ x0, 0, 20, 1y, although its leftmost non-zero element
is L “ 20, as 20{maxp1,U “ 0q “ 20 ą 3, this vector is
considered as Unlikely instead of Likely. Generally, as mundane
reasoning applications are often with shallow reasoning chains,
the confidence level of a fact can be approximated by selecting
the first non-zero value of {VU,U, L, V}.
Appendix B. Derivation of the minimum confidence vector.
To find the minimum confidence vector of C1 “
xVU1, U1, L1, V1y and c2 “ xVU2, U2, L2, V2y is to find
the smaller corresponding kappa value (i.e. smaller surprise).
By taking the exponentiation of kappa values (Equation 6) with
the infinitesimal base , κp1q ă κp2q is equivalent to
paVU11 ¨ aU12 ¨ aL13 ¨ aV14 q ą paVU21 ¨ aU22 ¨ aL23 ¨ aV24 q
ðñ a
VU1
1 ¨ aU12 ¨ aL13 ¨ aV14
aVU21 ¨ aU22 ¨ aL23 ¨ aV24
ą 1
ðñ aVU1´VU21 ¨ aU1´U22 ¨ aL1´L23 ¨ aV1´V24 ą 1
(B.1)
So at least one of the elements of
taVU1´VU21 , aU1´U22 , aL1´L23 , aV1´V24 u should be larger
than 1, which means at least one element of
pVU1 ´ VU2, U1 ´ U2, L1 ´ L2, V1 ´ V2q should be
negative. Since p0 ă a1 ă a2 ă a3 ă 1q, this can be
approximated from left to right as:
pVU1 ´ VU2 ă 0q _
pVU1 “ VU2 ^ pU1 ´ U2q ă 0q_
pVU1 “ VU2 ^ U1 “ U2 ^ pL1 ´ L2q ă 0q
pVU1 “ VU2 ^ U1 “ U2 ^ L1 “ L2 ^ pV1 ´ V2q ă 0q
(B.2)
This is equivalent to the definition of minimum confidence vec-
tor function in Equation 20, which can be used when merging
two confidence vectors when the reasoning chain is relatively
shallow. When large number appears in the confidence vector
(i.e deep chain) , for example, if a fact C is deduced from two
chains and noted as C1 and C2:
C1 “ xVU1,U1, L1,V1y “ x0, 0, 0, 70y
C2 “ xVU2,U2, L2,V2y “ x0, 0, 1, 1y (B.3)
Using Equation 20 or Equation B.2, C1 would be considered
as more likely than C2 since p0 “ 0q ^ p0 “ 0q ^ p0 ă 1q.
But if we take the numerical values of a1, a2, a3, a4 defined in
Equation A.5, C1 should actually be considered as “Unlikely”
(very surprised) since V “ 70{maxp1,U “ 0q ą 59 and C2 is
still considered as Likely, so C2 should be selected as the more
probable one. As the reasoning chains in our applications are
usually quite shallow, Equation B.2 is used in the prototype.
Appendix C. Lower and upper bound confidence vectors
relating to Formula 2
For the example in Eq 12, since the confidence in Rule 2
suggests the conditional probability Ppd|c, aq, we can obtain
the joint probability Ppc, a; dq as
Ppc, a; dq “ Ppc, aqPpd|c, aq “ PpcqPpa|cqPpd|c, aq (C.1)
The joint probability Ppc, aq depends on the dependencies be-
tween fact c and a. The conjunction of c and a can be consid-
ered as one compositional fact; then, Ppc, a; dq can be calcu-
lated using Formula 1 (section 3.2). For the joint probability of
Ppc, aq:
1) Lower bound probability: when the premises of a rule are
independent, the joint probability Ppc, aq can be written as the
product of Ppcq and Ppaq:
Ppc, a; dq “ PpcqPpa|cqPpd|c, aq ě PpcqPpaqPpd|c, aq
ěpaVUc`VUa`VUR21 ¨ aUc`Ua`UR22 ¨ aLc`La`LR23 ¨ aVc`Va`VR24 q
ñCmind “ xVUc ` VUa ` VUR2,Uc ` Ua ` UR2,
Lc ` La ` LR2,Vc ` Va ` VR2y
(C.2)
2) Upper bound probability: when the premises of a rule are
non-independent, especially when all facts are totally depen-
dent on one of the premises, e.g. If c happens, a always hap-
pens, we can have Ppa|cq “ 1 (which implies that Pa ě Pc
since Pa “ řc Ppa|cqPpcq “ Ppa|cqPpcq ` Ppa| cqPp cq “
Ppcq ` Ppa| cqPp cq), so the joint probability of c and a de-
pends on the minimum of Ppcq and Ppaq; accordingly, the larger
confidence vector of Cc and Ca.
Ppc, a; dq “ Ppc, aqPpd|c, aq “ PpcqPpa|cqPpd|c, aq
ďmintPpcq, PpaquPpd|c, aq
ďmintpaVUc1 ¨ aUc2 ¨ aLc3 ¨ aVc4 q, paVUa1 ¨ aUa2 ¨ aLa3 ¨ aVa4 quPpd|c, aq
ñ Cmaxd “ maxpCc, Caq ` xVUR2,UR2, LR2,VR2y
(C.3)
Derivation of the maximum confidence vector function is simi-
lar to minimum confidence vector in section Appendix B. This
suggests that the upper bound confidence in the conjunction of
facts is only as likely as the most unlikely conjunct.
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Appendix D. Implementation of rules with confidence lev-
els in Jess
As described in section 3.1.2, we use an ordered vector of
four numerical elements to encode the confidence level of a
rule or a fact, C “ xVU, U, L, Vy. For example, a rule “If
A happens, then it is likely that B will happen” is attached with
a confidence level Likely and the corresponding confidence vec-
tor is CR “ x0, 0, 1, 0y.
1) Implementing a fact with confidence vectors in Jess.
First, a template is defined in the Jess rule file to describe a fact
with its confidence vector and inferring history as below:
(clear)
;1)-define a template for a fact with its
confidence level and inference history
(deftemplate fact -history -vector
(slot name) ; the name of the fact being
described
(slot value) ; the value attached to the
fact
(slot vu (default 0)) ; very unlikely
(slot u (default 0)) ; unlikely
(slot l (default 0)) ; likely
(slot v (default 0)) ; very likely
(slot given) ; boolean value for indicating
whether a fact is given or assumed
(multislot mf) ; the list of missing facts
used for inferring this fact
(multislot gf) ; the list of given facts
used for inferring this fact
)
Slots are also reserved to store whether a fact is given or as-
sumed, as well as the missing/assumed facts and given/input
facts used for inferring this fact.
2) Implementing rules with confidence vectors in Jess.
Then, the rules developed by experts are converted to Jess
format and facts are expressed using the defined fact tem-
plate. For example, a rule “Rule 1: PipeLeaking is Ac-
tive ^ PipeLeakingRate is Severe De f initeùùùùñ TrenchBackfillWa-
terContent increases“ is implemented as below:
;2) -----create rules ------------
(defrule Rule1
(fact -history -vector (name PipeLeaking) (
value Active) (vu ?vu0) (u ?u0) (l ?l0)
(v ?v0) (given ?given0) (mf $?mf0) (gf
$?gf0))
(fact -history -vector (name PipeLeakingRate)
(value Severe) (vu ?vu1) (u ?u1) (l ?
l1) (v ?v1) (given ?given1) (mf $?mf1)
(gf $?gf1))
=>
; attach premises to the given or missing
fact list
(if ( and (= ?given0 true) (= ?given1 false)
) then
(bind $?gf (union$ $?gf0 $?gf1))
(bind $?mf (union$ $?mf0 $?mf1 (create$ "
PipeLeakingRate Severe" )))
else
(if ( and (= ?given1 true) (= ?given0 false)
) then
(bind $?gf (union$ $?gf1 $?gf0))
(bind $?mf (union$ $?mf1 $?mf0 (create$ "
PipeLeaking Active" )))
else
(if ( and (= ?given0 true) (= ?given1 true)
) then
(bind $?gf (union$ $?gf0 $?gf1))
(bind $?mf (union$ $?mf0 $?mf1 (create$ ))
)
else
)))
; rule has confidence: Rule1:Definite
(bind ?vu (+ ?vu0 ?vu1 0))
(bind ?u (+ ?u0 ?u1 0))
(bind ?l (+ ?l0 ?l1 0))
(bind ?v (+ ?v0 ?v1 0))
; assert a new fact with the updated
confidence vector
(assert (fact -history -vector (name
TrenchBackfillWaterContent) (value
increases) (vu ?vu) (u ?u) (l ?l) (v ?v)
(given true) (mf $?mf) (gf $?gf) ))
)
3) Asserting facts and Inference. To assert facts into a
knowledge base, a given fact is initialised by including itself in
the given fact list, whilst a missing fact is initialised by adding
itself in the missing fact list. For example, a trigger “PipeLeak-
ing is Active“ and an assumed fact “PipeLeakingRate is Se-
vere“ are asserted in Jess using the code below:
;3) --assert facts ----
(assert
; a given/input fact
(fact -history -vector (name PipeLeaking) (
value Active) (vu 0) (u 0) (l 0) (v 0) (
given true) (mf (create$)) (gf "
PipeLeaking Active "))
; a missing/assumed fact
(fact -history -vector (name PipeLeakingRate)
(value Severe) (vu 0) (u 0) (l 0) (v 0)
(given false) (mf "PipeLeakingRate
Severe ") (gf (create$)))
)
4) Inference. The predefined fact template, functions and
rules are stored in a rule file and are loaded into Jess for rea-
soning. With new facts asserted, Jess will apply all applicable
rules to the asserted facts using Rete algorithm (Forgy, 1982);
the confidence levels of rules and facts will be propagated dur-
ing this process. The code snippet is attached below:
;4) --run inference and display the final
facts ------
(run)
(facts)
Jess will apply all the rules to the asserted facts; the confi-
dence levels of rules and facts will be propagated during this
process.
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